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The recent audit failures and accounting scandals in the capital markets of China (e.g., ) and the U.S. (e.g., Enron) have resulted in increasing concern over corporate governance and audit quality. This paper applies agency theory to explain whether a firm's demand for quality-differentiated audits in China is affected by its ownership structure, which is predominated by three major types of shareholders, namely the state, institutions and individual investors. Specifically, I
hypothesize that the decrease of state shares, and the corresponding increase of institutional and tradable A-shares would lead to the demand for higher-quality audits in China's stock markets.
Agency theory suggests that a firm's ownership structure affects its demand for independent auditing (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) . When share ownership is dispersed and the majority of shareholders are composed of individual investors, there is an increased preference for credible financial information and thus for higher quality audits (DeFond, 1992; Francis and Wilson, 1988; Watts and Zimmerman, 1983) . When shares are concentrated and controlled by market-oriented economic entities and institutions, as opposed to government agencies, institutional investors have strong incentives to actively monitor firm management through independent auditing to promote the best interest of different institutions they represent (Bushee, 1998; Pound, 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) .
In China's stock markets, the government owns the majority of listed companies' shares. This dominance of share ownership by the government creates severe agency problems, which lead to poor firm performance (Qi et al., 2000; Xu and Wang, 1999; Wang, 2003) . The Chinese government has in recent years undertaken share ownership reform to reduce its holdings by selling off state shares to improve firm performance. This reform has brought changes in the ownership structures of Chinese listed companies.
This research investigates whether these changes in ownership structure affect the demand for quality-differentiated audits by listed companies in China. In this study, audit quality is proxied by auditor size, which is measured based on total clientele assets of an audit firm, and quality differentiated audits are captured by comparing the size of the new auditor with that of the old auditor in the year of auditor change. Thus, an auditor change from a smaller auditor to a larger auditor indicates a demand for a higher-quality auditor.
I test the hypothesis by analyzing 208 voluntary auditor switches over the [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] period. Consistent with the hypothesis, I find that the demand for quality audits increases in proportion to the increase in institutional shares and decreases in proportion to the increase in state shares. However, I find that diffused ownership by domestic investors is not associated with demand for higher audit quality. These results support the active monitoring role of institutional investors (Bushee, 1998; Pound, 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) and have important implications for policy makers. The results are robust after controlling for client size, leverage, industry, accruals, management change, return on equity and time effect, and for other alternative definitions of audit quality.
This paper contributes to literature on the role of auditing in the context of concentrated versus diffused ownership structures. Prior studies have typically examined the impact of ownership structure on audit quality in large mature markets (e.g., Chow, 1982; DeFond, 1992; Gul et al., 1999) . These studies all use management ownership to proxy a firm's ownership structure in a diffused To be eligible for listing, companies must report three consecutive years of profits and their return on equity (ROE) must equal or exceed 10% in the two years prior to an initial public offering. In order to raise additional capital, listed companies should have attained an average ROE of 10% for the prior three years, and at least 6% each year. According to Chinese regulations, stock shares will be labeled "ST"
for Special Treatment when a listed company experiences two consecutive annual net losses or when the net assets per share are lower than the stock's par value in the current year.
1 If the loss continues in the following fiscal year, the shares will be labeled "PT" for Particularly Transfer and share trading will be suspended. State shares are non-tradable, but are transferable to government-related institutions.
Institutional shares are those held by domestic legal entities including stock companies, financial institutions other than banks, and state-private mixed companies.
Securities firms, trust and investment companies, finance companies, mutual funds, and insurance companies constitute the bulk of non-bank financial institutions.
Institutional shares can only be traded in blocks in a designated market. Tradable A-shares are held publicly by individuals and/or domestic institutions, and can be traded in the stock market without restriction. (Insert Table 1 here)
Although the government has attempted to improve firm performance by setting up shareholding companies, many listed companies have not performed well.
For example, the percentage of firms reporting losses has increased from 6% in 1996 to 13% in 2002. Such poor corporate performance is frequently attributed to severe agency problems resulting from high government ownership of listed companies (Xu and Wang, 1999; Qi, et al., 2000; Wang, 2003) . Gao (1996) suggests that as long as the state remains the controlling shareholder, severe agency problems will persist. Table 2 .
(Insert Table 2 (Xu and Wang, 1999; Qi, et al., 2000; Wang, 2003) find that while a firm's profitability is positively correlated with the fraction of institutional shares and negatively correlated with the fraction of state shares, the influence of individual shareholders on a firm's profitability is irrelevant.
These studies attribute the lack of influence by individual shareholders to their incapability of monitoring managerial performance.
Literature Review and Research Hypothesis
Agency theory explains how to best organize relationships in which one party (the principal) determines the work, while another party (the agent) undertakes (Eisenhardt, 1985) . In business corporations, the essence of the agency problem is the separation of management and ownership, which gives rise to management-owner conflicts and thus agency costs. The manager needs the shareholders' funds and the shareholders need the manager's specialized human capital in order to generate returns on their funds. The agency problem here refers to the difficulties shareholders (the principal) have in assuring that their funds are not expropriated or wasted on unattractive projects by the manager (the agent). To mitigate the extent of agency conflicts, shareholders often replace fixed wages of the manager with compensation based on the profits of the firm, which are mainly reflected in financial reports. However, the determination of financial numbers necessarily involves discretion, which provides the manager an opportunity to manipulate these numbers. Hence, audited financial reports are widely viewed as a means of enhancing the credibility of management-prepared financial reports and mitigating agency costs.
Agency theory suggests that different types of ownership structure have different degrees of agency problems, which create different levels of incentives for controlling and monitoring the management of the firm, and thus varying levels of demand for quality audits (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; DeFond, 1992; Chow, 1982) .
There are two general types of ownership structure: dispersed and concentrated.
When share ownership is dispersed, as is typical in most UK and US listed companies, agency conflicts often arise between managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . The greater the agency conflicts between managers and shareholders, the higher the demand for quality audits (DeFond, 1992) . Prior studies typically use management ownership to proxy a firm's ownership structure (e.g., Chow, 1982; DeFond, 1992; Gul et al., 1999; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . When the manager owns none, or a small proportion, of the firm's shares, he or she has strong incentives to allocate the firm's resources in ways that are not necessarily consistent with the interests of the principal, because the firm manager aspires to maximize his or her own rather than the owners' utility function. The principal's welfare loss from the managers' divergent behavior is one type of agency cost. To reduce this cost, the principal attempts to control the agent's divergent behavior through monitoring activities. Auditing is a form of monitoring activity. Therefore, companies with low managerial ownership are more likely to engage a high quality auditor. As the manager's ownership increases, the costs to the manager of consuming perquisites also increase, because the manager bears a larger share of the costs of his or her actions. Thus, a firm with high level of managerial ownership would have a lesser need for higher-quality audits than a firm with a low level of managerial ownership (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) .
When share ownership is concentrated, as is typical in emerging and transitional economies, block shareholders own the majority of firms' shares and possess the voting rights. According to the efficient monitoring hypothesis (Pound, 1988; Bushee, 1998) , increased ownership by large external blockholders serves as a monitor of managers' actions and reduces the likelihood that managers would misuse the firm's resources. 4 Stapledon (1996) also suggests that large blockholders can improve firm performance by joining the firm's management. Thus, concentrated ownership is viewed as ameliorating the separation of ownership from control that creates agency problems. Accordingly, large blockholders have less incentive to manage a firm's earnings and would prefer to provide credible accounting information through quality audits to improve market returns (Teoh and Wong, 1993; Warfield et al., 1995) . In sum, firms with higher levels of state ownership lack sufficient incentives to monitor divergent management behavior. From an accounting perspective, the high concentration of s tate ownership provides the government with both the incentive and the ability to control the production of a firm's accounting information and its reporting policies. Given the required profit level for raising additional capital by listed companies, government owners have strong incentives to pressure management to resort to opportunistic choices of accounting methods, but little demand for quality audits (DeFond et al., 2000) . Moreover, as the government usually does not need to rely on publicly released financial information for holdings of institutions and blockholders, the greater the earnings informativeness (e.g., Warfield et al., 1995) . This suggests that, unlike government owners, institutional investors are likely to prefer credible financial information and hire quality auditors to improve earnings informativeness and market returns (Teoh and Wong, 1993 ).
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Under current Chinese regulations, at least 25% of shares outstanding must be sold to the general public. However, the vast majority of individual investors are relatively small investors and their representation on the boards of directors are extremely low even though they possess approximately one third of the total outstanding shares (Xu and Wang, 1999) . Such small shareholders do not have a big enough stake in the firm to absorb the costs of monitoring management (Grossman and Hart, 1980) . Consequently, no individual shareholder has adequate incentive to monitor management closely. Minority shareholders also lack the ability to claim damages due to the release of false information by listed companies, as there are no adequate corporate governance mechanisms to protect their interests, and the litigation costs involved are relatively high for individual shareholders. Furthermore, most individual investors in China buy stocks for speculative purposes rather than dividend income or long-term growth (Xu and Wang, 1999) . This short investment horizon makes individual investors unwilling to monitor and control actions taken by managers. Therefore, although diffused ownership by individual investors 7 Lee and Gray (2002) argue that in countries where bankers are more significant than shareholders as financiers of corporations, as in France, Germany, and Japan, banks would have direct access to required information, and thus their demand for publicly available financial information would not be very strong. Compared to banks in Japan, Chinese banks play a more passive role on monitoring their clients. This is because banks in China are restricted from engaging in share trading. Unlike Germany and Japan, all institutional shares are held by non-bank financial institutions in China (Xu and Wang, 1999) . Moreover, although banks maintain close financial ties with companies through debt financing, most banks in China are controlled by the government and therefore, they have not been very active in monitoring clients' activities. In a major step towards the resolution of China's serious banking problems, the government established four state-owned non-banking asset management companies in 1999 to deal with the huge burden of non-performing loans from the state-owned banks (Lin et al., 2003) .
theoretically provides the basis for a demand for independent auditing, individual investors may not necessarily demand credible information through quality audits (DeFond, 1992; Francis and Wilson, 1988; Watts and Zimmerman, 1983) .
Prior studies frequently attribute poor performance of listed companies in China to their ownership structure, which gives rise to severe agency problems (e.g., Qi et al., 2000; Gao, 1996; Xu and Wang, 1999; Wang, 2003 Second, because that companies received prior audit qualifications tend to switch auditors in the subsequent year (Chow and Rice, 1982; Krishnan, 1994; Krishnan and Stephens, 1995) , companies receiving qualified opinions in the year before an auditor switch are excluded. Third, companies that switched auditors more than twice during a three-year period are eliminated from the sample, since these switches may relate to factors other than ownership structure change (e.g., opinion shopping). Fourth, since failing companies have a greater tendency to switch auditors than healthier companies (Schwartz and Menon, 1985) , companies reporting two or three consecutive years of loss (i.e., ST and PT companies) are deleted from the sample.
Fifth, companies issuing B-shares are excluded from the sample, because a change in the domestic auditor could be the result of a change in the international auditor for a B-share company. Finally, companies with unusually high growth (i.e., a doubling/trebling in size) are excluded from the sample so as not to give undue weight to these high-growth companies (DeFond, 1992) . Thus, the final sample consists of 208 firm-year observations. Table 3 displays the construction and the constitution of the final sample.
(Insert Table 3 here)
Regression model
As discussed earlier, a change in ownership structure may give rise to greater demand for quality-differentiated audits. In this study, audit quality is proxied by auditor size, which is measured based on client size relative to the total clientele of an audit firm (DeAngelo, 1981; DeFond, 1992; Francis and Wilson, 1988) The dependent variable, ?Quality, is defined as the natural logarithm of the ratio of combined assets of listed companies audited by the new auditor to that by the old auditor in the year of auditor switch (DeAngelo, 1981; Francis and Wilson, 1988; Johnson and Lys, 1990; Defond, 1992) . Thus, a ratio above one suggests a greater preference for a higher-quality auditor. Changes in ownership structure are measured as changes in the percentage of shares held by the state, institutions, and individual investors, respectively, between year t and t-1. I predict that the coefficient b 1 will be negative and that b 2 , and b 3 will be positive.
Six agency-related variables are used to control for the effect of changes in agency costs on auditor choice. 11 Increases in client firm size can be expected to increase agency costs due to increased remoteness of principals from the observation of agents' actions. The larger the size of client firm, the greater the magnitude of wealth transfers (agency costs). Since client size is significantly related to auditor choice (DeFond, 1992; Healy and Lys, 1986 ), a ?Size variable, measured as the percentage change in total assets between year t and t-1, is included in the model.
Another type of contractual relationship with the potential for divergence of interests is the relationship between debtholders and shareholders. As the amount of debt increases, the potential amount of the wealth transfer away from debtholders increases, resulting in a greater incentive for such transfers and a greater demand for monitoring (Chow, 1982; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Jensen and Meckling, 1976 judgment and discretion, which gives the manager an opportunity to manipulate these numbers via short-term accruals (DeFond, 1992; Healy, 1985) . One mechanism for enhancing the credibility of management-prepared accounting numbers is to hire a quality auditor. Therefore, the larger the short-term accruals, the greater the vulnerability to earnings management and the greater the demand for quality audits as a monitoring mechanism. In this study, I use ?Accrual, which is measured as the change in the ratio of short-term accruals to total assets between year t and t-1, to measure the effect of vulnerability to manipulation on the demand for monitoring.
Short-term accruals are constructed as changes in accounts receivable plus inventory minus accounts payable and accrued expense over the two years. A positive sign of coefficient for ?Accrual represents an increased demand for quality audits.
Notationally,
As with size, the complexity of an organization increases the agency costs.
The greater the complexity and diversity of an organization's activities and operations, the greater the difficulty in monitoring the divergent behavior of agents.
In China, companies in protected industries (e.g., petrochemicals, energy, and raw materials) are large monopolies. As these companies are generally more complex and geographically dispersed than unprotected companies, they are likely to demand quality audits to monitor the manager's divergent behavior. Accordingly, I include an Industry dummy variable in the model (coded one for protected companies and zero otherwise) to capture organizational diversity and complexity.
Return on equity (ROE) is an important quantitative criteria and index for the regulatory authorities to assess the companies' financial conditions for the initial public offering and the rights issue. Chinese regulations stipulate that l isted companies must maintain a minimum ROE for raising additional capital by a rights issue. Hence financially distressed companies are more likely than healthier companies to make income-increasing accounting changes to meet arbitrary profit targets, and to hire more accommodating auditors to mask these changes (DeFond et al., 2000) . In this study, a ?ROE variable is included in the model to control for the impact of firm performance on auditor reporting decisions. This variable is measured as the percentage change in ROE between year t and t-1. Carpenter and Strawser (1971) and Fearnly (1995 and 1998b) find that management change (the chairman of the board, the general manager, and CEO) often leads to an auditor change. Agency theory considers the auditor-client relationship as a mutual contract. A change in management (principal) may alter the principal-agent relationship, which in turn could lead to a change in auditor (agent).
In this study, a dummy variable, Management (coding one for management change before the year of auditor switch and zero otherwise), is included in the model to capture the effect of management change on auditor switching. Finally, the year dummy variable, After99, is included in the model to control for the change in the audit environment (particularly the audit firm mergers after 1999). are directionally supportive of the association of changes in ownership structure with the choice of auditor. Meaning, the greater the decreases (increases) in the proportion of state shares (institutional and individual shares), the greater the demand for a large-sized auditor.
Empirical Results
Descriptive statistics
(Insert Table 4 here) state shares, which may reflect the official position that the state should remain in control of key industries.
Regression results
(Insert Table 5 here)
To avoid multicollinearity problems arising from the high correlation (-0.973) between ?State and ?Institutions if these two variables are simultaneously included in the model, I run two separate regressions and report the results in Table 6 .
(Insert Table 6 here)
Both models are significant at the 5% level, which indicates a strong relationship between the dependent and independent variables. All of the significant coefficient signs in the models are in the hypothesized directions. As predicted by the proposition that as companies in protected industries have less need to use earnings management to respond to regulatory constraints on profit level (Aharony, et al., 2000) , they have incentives to use a higher-quality auditor to improve the credibility of accounting information. This is also consistent with agency theory which states that the greater the complexity and geographical dispersion of an organization's activities and operations, the greater the difficulty in monitoring the divergent behavior of agents, thus the greater the demand for reputable auditors to monitor the manager's deviating actions.
Sensitivity analysis
I perform the following four sets of sensitivity tests and summarize the results in Table 7 . First, I test whether the results are robust to alternative definitions of the dependent variable. In this regard, I rerun the regressions by using two alternative definitions for audit quality: (1) auditor affiliation and (2) groups based on the total client assets audited, since top 10 auditors in China are of higher quality than their counterparts (DeFond et al., 2000) . 13 Thus, a change from a non-top 10 to a top 10 auditor suggests a demand for a higher-quality auditor. In the independence model, I consider economic dependence of auditors upon their clients and compute this dependence as the difference between the ratios of the switching client firm's assets to the total assets of the clients of the old auditor, minus the same ratio for the new auditor (DeFond, 1992) . Positive difference suggests a preference for a quality-differentiated auditor. Table 7 (Tests 1 and 2) reports the results of regressing auditor affiliation and independence variables.
(Insert Table 7 here) Second, I examine whether the results are sensitive to alternative classifications of ownership structure. Wang (2003) further classifies state shareholders into bureaucratic state shareholders and corporate state shareholders, 14 and finds that firm performance is negatively correlated with government-controlled firms.
Following this classification, I break up the ownership of state shares into two categories, i.e., shares owned by government agencies and shares held by corporations such as SOEs. As corporations are market-oriented economic entities and act similarly to institutions, I treat corporate shareholders and institutional shareholders as a homogeneous group. The results of replicating Table 6 using this alternative classification of share ownership are reported in Test 3 of Table 7 .
Third, instead of using the annual changes in ownership structure over two to measure dependent and independent variables. Empirical results are reported in 14 Bureaucratic state shareholders are government bureaus including central government ministries and commissions, national industry groups, local government bureaus, local state assets management bureaus, and local state assets management companies. Corporate state shareholders are non-government agencies such as SOEs or other types of market-oriented economic entities (Wang, 2003) . All of the sensitivity test results point to a single conclusion regarding the 5, indicating that larger firms are more likely to engage an auditor who is of higher quality than smaller firms.
In conclusion, the main results, together with the results of sensitivity tests, suggest that greater institutional ownership can improve the supply of credible accounting information via quality audits by listed companies in China.
Conclusions
To improve firm performance and corporate governance, China has in recent years relaxed governmental control over corporate affairs through ownership reform.
The reform has brought about changes in firm ownership structure. This paper examines whether changes in corporate ownership affect the demand for differential shares is an important step in improving the efficiency of China's stock markets, the effectiveness of corporate governance, and the credibility of accounting information.
The results are subject to some limitations. The hypothesis that larger audit firms provide higher quality audits is based on the a rgument put forward by DeAngelo (1981) that as larger audit firms have more clients, they have more aggregate client-specific quasi-rents at stake if a low-quality audit becomes known.
Empirical studies using pricing in IPOs, discretionary accruals, earnings response Variable definitions: ?Quality = Natural logarithm of the ratio of combined assets of companies audited by the new auditor to that by the old auditor in the year of auditor change. ?State = Percentage change in state shares between year t and t-1. ?Institutions = Percentage change in institutional shares between year t and t-1. ?Individuals = Percentage change in individual shares between year t and t-1. ?Size = Percentage change in client firm assets between year t and t-1. ?Leverage = Change in the ratio of total liabilities to total assets between year t and t-1. ?Accrual = Change in the ratio of short-term accruals to total assets between year t and t-1. Industry = 1 if the client firm operates in the 'protected' industries and 0 otherwise. ?ROE = Percentage change in return on equity between year t and t-1. Management = 1 if client firm changes its management and 0 otherwise. After99 = 1 if the client firm switched auditor after year 1999, and 0 otherwise.
* , ** , *** : Significant at 10%, 5%, 1% 39 
